

17 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

SUBJECT : Defense Presentation on Mobilization Planning

(Oral)

1. You may wish to point out that from an intelligence point of view two key assumptions underlying the Defense briefing are highly unrealistic:

a. It is extremely unlikely that M-day will precede D-day by six months. As pointed out most recently in the new NIE 11-4-58, the Soviets would seek to achieve optimum strategic surprise. Except in the event of a prolonged period of crisis perhaps including limited war, we could hardly count on having six months to achieve war strength. In a nuclear-missile age it would be far more realistic to assume that D-day and M-day would be simultaneous (the worst case) and to regard any prior time for mobilization as a bonus.

b. The mobilization plan still does not take nuclear bomb damage into account. This is admitted in the briefing, but it operates to invalidate the whole mobilization concept presented. In 11-4 again, we estimate that the Soviets will initiate general war by "strategic nuclear attacks". Ergo, any plan which does not fully take this into account is invalid from the outset.

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